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ABSTRACT
Stability has been a primary focus of the maritime industry and of immense interest to the IMO from the outset.
Despite several attempts to resolve stability-related issues, the problem of stability remains one that has yet to
be resolved. Reasons for this, range from the complexity of the problem itself to misconceptions in its very
nature, particularly concerning intact or compromised conditions of the ship in question.  Emphasis in this
paper is placed on the latter.  More specifically, whilst intact stability of ships is an extremely interesting
scientific problem, to what extent is it a determining factor in the design and operation of passenger ships?
Currently, intact stability and damage stability share the same stage from a regulatory perspective and,
consequently, they have equal impact on design and operation-related decisions, an example of which is the
use of combined intact and damage stability GM limit curves (e.g. IACS Rec 110 Rev1). However, in line with
goal-based regulations and standards, design and operational decisions should be risk-informed in which case,
matters relating to damage stability are of higher concern, simply by virtue of the fact that damage stability is
by far the greater risk contributor. In fact, for passenger ships (>500GT), the level of risk associated with intact
stability is indiscernible in contrast to that of damage stability. More importantly, in the operational loading
conditions of such vessels, damage stability is a more dominant constraint. Hence, such ships can be designed
on the basis of damage stability considerations alone. This paper delves in this direction by drawing on the
current regulation-making process for risk estimation as adopted by IMO as well as current design and
operational practice. Findings from European research and related studies are provided in order to substantiate
the argument that intact stability for passenger ships is neither a safety issue nor a design concern.
Keywords: Intact stability, FSA, ship safety/risk, ship design and operation
1. INTRODUCTION
From a basic Naval Architecture perspective,
concerning the design of a ship, the most
fundamental objective is for the ship to remain afloat
and upright, in normal operations and in
emergencies, particularly flooding casualties. The
relevant terms are “displacement”, relating to overall
capacity at the design draft and “freeboard”, relating
to the residual capacity, measured from the design
draught to the freeboard deck (IMO ILLC’66).  The
second fundamental goal is that the ship will remain
upright in the presence of external forces, even
following serious loss of internal buoyancy
(potentially with a list in this case).  Both concepts
emerged together with Naval Architecture and are as
ancient as Archimedes, circa 250 BC. The topic of
stability of ships (and more generally of floating
bodies) has fascinated eminent scientists throughout
the centuries and despite unrelenting efforts
institutionally and at world scale, research remains
relevant and of high focus. Stability combines deep
scientific understanding with practical and ethical
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concerns stemming from a continually changing
industry and society and, as such, it represents a
prime driver for naval architects. It is not a
coincidence that the form and consequences of
stability regulations are at the forefront of interest at
the IMO (e.g., Maritime Safety Committee and Sub-
Committee on Ship Design and Construction). Many
ship stability problems remain “unsolved” and the
subject will remain a key focus for as long as there
is human activity at sea.
From a wider perspective, maritime safety
permeates all physical and temporal boundaries and,
as such, is one of the most influential goals in ship
design and operation.  All human activity in a "risky"
environment, such as the sea, is fraught with wide-
ranging problems that tend to undermine safety. This
is particularly true for knowledge-intensive and
safety-critical ships, such as passenger ships, where
the need for innovation creates unprecedented safety
challenges. The Design for Safety philosophy and
the ensuing formalised methodology, Risk-Based
Design, was introduced in the maritime industry as
late as in the mid-nineties as a design paradigm to
help bestow safety as a design objective and a life-
cycle imperative (Vassalos and Fan, 2016). This was
meant to ensure that rendering safety a design driver
would incentivise the maritime industry to seek cost-
effective safety solutions, in response to rising
societal expectations. In this respect, the adoption of
a goal-based approach to address safety has had a
profound effect, the full impact of which is yet to be
delivered (IMO GBS-SLA). As a result, the subject
of ship safety is one of the fastest changing topics,
absorbing all forms of knowledge in the strife to
respond to unrelenting societal pressure for higher
safety standards and do so cost-effectively.  Stability
is a key focus in this quest.
However, with the focus clearly on passenger
ships, certain fundamental principles have been
overlooked, as a result of which all matters of
stability are being pursued in the same vein,
irrespective of the fact that safety implications
between intact and damage stability are strikingly
different. Put it differently, whilst damage stability
for passenger ships constitutes the most severe safety
problem, responsible for over 90% of loss of life at
sea, intact stability-related loss of life, is miniscule.
In fact, it is orders of magnitude lower, apart from
small ships where these can be overpowered by
waves, cargo shift and other excessive moments
leading to capsize and potential loss of life. Usually,
such ships are not involved in international trade.
Using this notion as a platform, this paper will
demonstrate that loss of life (the risk) attributed to
intact stability is too small to be measured for
practical use. The basis for this is the IMO-
established methodology for risk estimation of a
given hazard in support of the regulation-making
process i.e., the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). In
this respect, evidence will be presented to
substantiate this claim in support of the argument
that intact stability is not a safety issue for passenger
ships. Industry has realised this many years ago and
took action by: (a) increasing GM 3-fold to avoid
dynamic stability problems (e.g., parametric roll,
dead-ship condition) and (b) installing sophisticated
motion stabilisers to ensure reduced motions and
accelerations as well as provide maximum comfort
in all operating conditions.
Having said this, with focus on damage stability
considerations, innovative solutions will be
identified, which with time, could potentially render
damage stability an equitable risk contributor to
intact stability (Vassalos, et al, 2019).  Risk balance
will then become a key design concern in which case
both intact and damage stability will be deserve due
attention.
Intact stability is not a design concern!  This
sounds even more precarious than intact stability not
being a safety issue.  However, evidence presented
in the paper demonstrates that within the operational
range of passenger ships (cruise ships and RoPax),
ship design and operation are governed by damage
stability considerations. This is unsurprising, as it is
the case for other safety-critical ship types such as
surface combatants.
Realising this, will not change current design
practice substantially (in terms of substituting one
limiting curve with another or continue using the 2nd
Generation Intact Stability criteria as guidelines,
currently under consideration at IMO (SDC 6/5,
2019), but will help the profession to focus, identify
and resolve damage stability issues as primary
concern, thus investing cost-effectively to improve
maritime safety. In addition, operational data for
these ships will be used to show that, in the range of
drafts where passenger ships normally operate,
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stability requirements are dictated by damage
stability considerations. Stemming from the above,
specific conclusions are drawn.
2. FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
With the advent of goal-based standards, risk-
based approaches and regulations have been
introduced in the maritime industry to guide ship
design and operation. However, whilst such
approaches address by definition the life cycle of the
ship, the focus of the regulations remains design-
biased.
 Risk-based ship design introduces risk analysis
and evaluation into the traditional design process
with the ultimate aim of meeting safety objectives
cost-effectively. Risk, in this respect, is a metric for
quantifying safety performance. With safety treated
as a  measurable objective, design optimisation can
effectively be expanded and the new objective to
minimise risk can be addressed alongside other
traditional design objectives relating to earning
potential, speed, cargo carrying capacity, etc.,
(Sames, 2007). One of the main outputs relates to
“balanced” decision-making concerning risk, cost
and performance on the basis of risk evaluation
thresholds.
The vehicle for this in the maritime industry is
IMO, concerning regulatory developments and
amendments. One instrument that is fundamentally
risk-centric is the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
process, which was introduced by the IMO as a
direct response to the explosion of the Piper Alpha
offshore platform in the North Sea, where 167
people lost their lives. The first integration of FSA
in the regulation-making process took place in 2002,
by the approval of relevant guidelines laid out in
MSC/Circ. 1023 - MEPC/Circ. 392 (IMO, 2002).
Recently, the FSA guidelines have been revised
twice by MSC/Circ.1180 - MEPC/Circ.474 (IMO,
2005) superseded by MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.5. (IMO,
2018).  The FSA is a rational, holistic and systematic
process for assessing risks relating to maritime
safety, the protection of the marine environment, and
for evaluating costs and benefits of various options
to reduce these risks (IMO, 2015). Notably, the use
of FSA is consistent with, and will provide support
to, the IMO decision-making process, leading to
international legislation for rendering pertinent risks
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The
FSA includes a number of generic, logically
arranged steps as indicated in Figure 1, which reflect
different stages of resolving a safety issue.
Figure 1: Process of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
In the era in which the maritime community
changes direction from a reactive to a proactive
safety approach, the Formal Safety Assessment
provides the right vehicle for risk-informed
legislation and general decision making.
Relating to the problem at hand, the European
project (SAFEDOR, 2005-2009) performed Formal
Safety Assessments for both RoPax and Cruise Ships
with the view to quantifying related risks during the
life-cycle. Table 1 next, summarises the results of
the FSAs.
As one could readily observe, intact stability is
absent from the potential risk contributors, not
because it was omitted from the analysis but because
the contribution to risk from intact stability concerns
is negligible. Despite the fact that loss includes
consequences of heavy seas and tropical rain, large
ship motions and impact of water ingress into the
cargo hold, the risk remains negligible.
In the case of RoPax ships, the FSA includes
accidents from 1994 to 2004 (IMO, 2008b) and for
cruise ships from 1990 to 2004 (IMO, 2008a). Even
though, the risk for collisions, grounding and
contact/impact is very high, water ingress due to
damage has been investigated separately for the case
of RoPax vessels. The results indicate a PLL
(Potential Loss of Life) due to flooding as high as
1.12E-1 per ship-year.
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Table 1: FSA findings for Passenger ships derived from
project SAFEDOR. Indication of frequency and Potential
Loss of Life per ship year.
3. SAFEDOR CASE STUDY
In the European project (SAFEDOR, 2005-
2009), (Themelis et al., 2007) presented a novel
method of probabilistic assessment for intact
stability, applicable to different ship types. One of
the ship types considered is a RoPax ferry, which
aided in identifying the fraction of risk for different
problems related to intact stability.
The approach was tailored for a specific ship,
assessing three failure modes, namely: beam-sea
resonance, parametric rolling and pure loss of
stability for specific routes in Mediterranean Sea.
The methodology entailed identification of critical
wave groups that give rise to dynamic responses
exceeding a threshold, which is established based on
the probability of encountering pertinent critical
wave groups for the areas under consideration. The
assessment of the intact stability-related failure
modes or else “instability” is based on the
development of wave environment thresholds. The
developed failure norms address distinctively the
safety of the ship.  For the RoPax vessel, this norm
is expressed through a critical angle of roll.
The results of the study are provided in Table 2.
In particular, the findings of the analysis indicate
very low probability of instability when mean
seasonal values (even for winter) are considered.
This is the case for the marginal probabilities of Hs
and Tz, accordingly. From an operational
perspective, in order to account for actual cases, the
joint probability of encountering Hs and Tz is
considered (Themelis and Spyrou, 2007), as shown
in the table below, in which the values refer to the
entire voyage time.
Table 2: Probabilities for ROPAX (Themelis and Spyrou,
2007)
Total
probability
Critical time
ratio
Beam-sea resonance
Ship (ĳ>35°) 1.88E-16 2.74E-16
Parametric rolling
Ship (ĳ>35°) 4.99E-28 9.64E-28
Pure loss of stability
Ship (ĳ>35°) 6.49E-19 1.86E-19
In simple terms, indicative values for intact-
stability-related risk are miniscule on the basis of
such low frequencies of encountering critical wave
conditions, even assuming conservatively that such
encounters will lead to life loss.
According to the authors (Themelis and Spyrou,
2007): “These probabilities represent the number of
critical waves over the total number of encountered
waves. With this in mind, considering a ship lifetime
of 25 years, half of which at sea and a mean wave
period of 8 seconds, for a year of continuous vessel
operation (60 x 60 x 24 x 365/8), 25 years of the ship
lifetime produces 10^8 waves per ship”. This means
that a fleet of 5E20 needs to operate continuously for
25 years in order to have 1 parametric roll according
to the low probabilities shown in Table 2.  However,
it will be of interest to undertake a complete study
aimed at clarifying this issue as a general concern.
4. LIMITING GM CURVES
Design Condition
Currently, intact and damage stability
considerations and ensuing requirements are
expressed in the form of limiting GM curves for
intact and damage stability, both presented without
any due consideration of the risk associated with
each condition. This leads to the same emphasis
being placed for intact and damage stability
requirements and this, in turn, may lead to sub-
optimal designs. More specifically, for passenger
ships, the risk due to damage stability is orders of
magnitude higher than that pertaining to intact
stability and this information is not being reflected
Type
Frequency (per ship
year)
PLL (per ship year)
Collision 1.25E-02 2.34E-02
Grounding 9.57E-03 2.57E-02
Impact 1.25E-02 1.39E-03
Flooding 2.39E-03 1.12E-01
Fire 8.28E-03 5.95E-02
Total 4.52E-02 2.22E-01
Collision 4.60E-03 2.40E-01
Contact 1.20E-03 9.20E-03
Grounding 9.80E-03 1.50E-01
Fire/Explosion 8.90E-03 1.50E-02
Others 2.00E-02 6.40E-03
Total 4.45E-02 4.21E-01
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through the limiting curves, thus not being properly
accounted for in the design process and during
operation.
Damage stability is assessed for thousands of
damage cases and potential scenarios, in three
loading conditions (dl, dp, ds), using the Attained
Index as a means of statutory compliance. On this
basis, the Limiting GM curves are derived following
compliance of each draft with the inequality A0.9R
for passenger ships. This way, risk (for example,
Potential Loss of Life – PLL) is calculable and
reflects all requisite knowledge.  For intact stability,
on the other hand, to date, the limiting curve is
derived following compliance with the severe wind
and rolling criterion for different KGs, indicating the
ability of a vessel to withstand the combined effects
of beam wind and rolling in a scenario that bears
little or no relation to reality.  Second generation
intact stability criteria address more realistically
intact-stability related concerns, including potential
problems but risk estimation remains
characteristically absent. This being the case, the
ensuing results lack risk content and information.
Therefore, from a risk-based perspective, any
deduction on risk pertaining to intact and damage
stability and comparison between the two, could be
misleading. In the face of this, ships may be sub-
optimally designed.
On the other hand, the limiting GM curve linked
to intact stability provides implicit information on
the payload as a function of draft and KG. This, in
turn, allows designers at the early stages of design to
make decisions concerning global ship parameters
and loading conditions. Accounting for this, it will
be of interest to examine if passenger ships could be
designed from damage stability considerations
alone.
Pertaining to the above, Figure 2 and Figure 3
below indicate the limiting GM curves for intact and
intact stability relating to medium/large passenger
ships (cruise ship and RoPax). Three points are
noteworthy:
(a) ships are designed with a large GM margin for
better life-cycle stability management
(b) the damage stability limiting GM is dominant,
particularly at the design draft (5.35m for
RoPax and 8.75m for the cruise ship)
(c) The gap between intact and damage stability
requirements widens with increasing drafts.
Related to this, previous studies from (Paterson
et al., 2018) have demonstrated that passenger ships
operate at the upper region of their draft distribution
when actual operational profiles are considered.
More specifically, almost 75% of the loading
conditions operate at drafts higher than the SOLAS
damage stability partial draft.
Figure 2: Intact and damage limiting GM curves along with
design loading conditions for a medium size RoPax
Figure 3: Intact and damage limiting GM curves along with
design loading conditions for a large cruise ship
These limits, as described above, are meant to
provide for safe operation and, as such, there is a link
to risk. Attempting to calculate this for both intact
and damage stability is not straightforward and
hence a heuristic approach is utilised herewith, based
on frequency estimation of pertinent events. This is
used as a metric for Potential Loss of Life (fatalities)
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as a function of the People On Board (POB). This is
shown in Figure 4 for the RoPax and cruise ship
referred to earlier.
This way, for intact stability, incident-specific
frequency per ship year is used incorporating all
three potential modes of loss as provided in Table 2.
For damage stability, pertinent results for this ship
are given in the EMSA III Project (EMSA, 2013).
 Figure 4 shows the difference between intact
and damage stability-related risk (PLL), which spans
orders of magnitude. The difference between RoPax
and Cruise ship stems merely from the difference in
size and passenger capacity. Following this process
of assigning risk content in the intact stability
limiting curve, leads to uncharacteristically low
intact stability limiting GMs. As a result, it would
not be sensible to consider intact and damage
stability limits together, a point made frequently in
the past.
Figure 4: Potential Loss of Life per ship life for one cruise
ships and one RoPax for intact and damage stability
respectively
Operational condition
In the operational stage of the life-cycle of
passenger ships, vessels tend to operate at the upper
envelope between the partial and deepest damage
stability drafts, as mentioned in the foregoing. This
is demonstrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6 for RoPax
and Cruise ship, respectively. The graphs show that
all operational conditions are governed by damage
stability requirements for the related operational
range.
Figure 5: Operational and design conditions along with
damage and intact damage limiting GM curves for a large
RoPax
Figure 6: Operational conditions, damage and intact damage
limiting GM curves for a large cruise ship
5. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the information and arguments
presented in the foregoing, the following
conclusions nay be drawn:
x For passenger ships (>500GT), the level of risk
associated with intact stability is indiscernible in
contrast to that of damage stability.
x Given that design and operational decisions
should be risk informed, matters relating to
damage stability should be given priority. In this
respect, recently agreed 2nd Generation Intact
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Stability Recommendations will serve a useful
purpose.
x However, given that in the operational draft range
of passenger ships damage stability
considerations are dominant, ships could be
designed on the basis of damage stability
considerations alone, in that this indirectly caters
for intact stability requirements.
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